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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the need for tacti-
cally responsive space systems capable of 
supporting battlefield and fleet commanders. 
Terminology used to describe this category 
of satellite system varies according to 
organization or agency. The Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency's 
Lightsat, the Naval Space Command's SPI/>.f-
SAT, and the Air Force Space Command s 
TACSAT, are reviewed. The Unite~ ~tat~s 
Space Command's space support mISSIOn IS 
addressed and the role single-purpose 
satellites can play in fUlfilling requirements 
for operationally responsive satellite systems 
is described. The United States and Depart-
ment of Defense space policies are 
discussed. The position taken by Secretary 
of Defense, Frank Carlucci reg.ardin,g 
CHEAPSATS is discussed. The relatzonshlp 
between multi-mission and single-purpose 
satellite systems is delineated, in addition to 
fulfilling specific mission requirements, 
single-purpose satellite systems can augment 
multi-mission systems in crisis or fill tempo-
rary outages. Candidate functions for sin-
gle-purpose satellites which include: com-
munications, surveillance, meteorology, and 
store and forward (to readout remote 
sensors or transfer data to forward users) 
are discussed. 
This paper identifies major factors 
which have contributed to the high cost of 
today's satellite systems and suggests: 
1) modifying or eliminating milit~ry sta~­
dards which are no longer applIcable m 
light of today's modern highly reliable 
technology; 2) eliminating the req'!irement 
for redundant systems where operatIOnal r:e-
quirements clearly do not warrant them (I.e. 
a tactical system required to support a bat-
tlefield commander for six months ~es not 
require redundant systems to. pr:o.V1de three 
year life expectancy); 3) maxlm~zmg the use 
of commercial-off-the-shelf equipment; and 
4) adapting best commercia,l practices dur-
ing dev~lopment. 1 n~~ p~llosop~y regar~­
ing testmg and rell.abillty IS provl~ed. Th,s 
philosophy is reqwred to make smgle-pur-
pose satellite systems cost effective. 
Reducing the production costs of single-
purpose satellite systems will not guarantee 
an inexpensive system since launch costs 
constitute a major portion of a system's 
overall cost. The smallest launch vehicle 
available today is the 1950's technology 
Scout, with a launch cost of approximately 
$10 million. New launch technology such 
as that used in the Pegasus launch system 
can reduce burdensome launch costs. The 
current vertical launch integration 
philosophy and capabilities are not respon-
sive to operational requirements. 
Horizontal launch integration methods and 
new launch systems derived from commer-
cial ventures have the potential to make 
space systems more responsive to tactical 
commanders as well as decreasing total sys-
tem cost. 
A systems approach to .meeting 
operational requirements should be mco.rpo-
rated into architectures and operatzonal 
concepts. This approach would tak~ adva',l-
tage of symbiotic relationships whIch eXIst 
between today's systems and future single-
purpose systems. Planning should empha-
size the day-to-day use of a set of t~ese 
single-purpose systems to ensure operation-
al personnel are proficien,t. Single-purpose 
satellites have the potentIal to profoundly 
impact the use of space systems by tactical 
commanders in the theater environment. 
SINGLE PURPOSE SATELLITE 
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by 
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INTRODUCTION 
Within the last two years, there has been 
a resurgence of interest in Single Purpose 
Inexpensive Satellite Systems (SPINSATS), 
reference the recent compromise between 
DARPA and the Air Force regarding 
D ARPA's Lightsat program which calls for 
DARPA to down play work on launchers 
and concentrate on low-cost satellite 
technology. DARPA is pursuing Lightsat 
Research and Development (R&D), an area 
previously dominated by the Air Force l . 
Organizations/agencies have different 
terminology for small satellite systems. 
The Navy uses the term SPINSAT2, the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) refers to this class of 
satellites as Lightsats, recently the Air Force 
Space Command (AFSPACECOM) has 
begun to define this class of satellites as 
Tactical Satellites (T ACSATS), another term 
which has been used is CHEAPSAT. The 
former Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. 
Aldridge Jr. was of the opinion that cheap 
satellites could not be built to perform the 
missions of todays large multi-mission space 
vehicles3• Today's technology does not 
allow all the functions of large satellites to 
be packaged into a small satellite. However, 
there are several reasons why small satellites 
1. "DARPA Buys Lightsat Launcher", MILITARY 
SPACE, Pasha Publications, 24 April, 1989, 
pp.3. 
2. The tenn SPINS AT has been used by Dr. 
William E. Howard, III, Director of Technology, 
Naval Space Command, for several years. Dr. 
Howard is the flrst person I know to have used 
the tenn. 
3. Edward C. Aldridge Jr., "Consistency", 
DEFENSE 88. November/December, 88 issue, 
pp.14. 
2 
are gaining in popUlarity and may become 
the systems of the future. The Wall Street 
Journal carried an article in their February 9, 
1989 issue which discussed activities in the 
small satellite area. One of the more 
noteworthy items in the article was a 
reference to Senator Robert Byrd's (D 
W.VA) space symposium held in January of 
this year. Senator Byrd sees small satellite 
development as a "hot new industry essential 
to national security and international 
competition ... 4 
The 1987 revision to the 1982 DoD 
Space Policy recognized that space was a 
medium just like land, sea, and air in which 
military operations may be conducted for 
force enhancement and force application. 
Control of space is a vital element of the 
new space policy. Control of space means 
the freedom to operate systems in space and 
the capability to deny an adversary the 
ability to operate in space when the need 
arises. 
To the average field commander, 
satellites tend to be viewed as fragile, non-
survivable, non-responsive, temperamental 
systems which cannot be relied upon in time 
of conflict Proliferation of satellites is a 
method of increasing survivability and 
adding robustness to a space system. The 
cost of todays satellites make proliferation 
highly unlikely, although the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) does rely on a 
proliferated constellation of 24 satellites to 
achieve robustness at a cost of several billion 
dollars. GPS fulfills responsiveness 
requirements by having a large number of 
satellites in orbit. An alternative to 
maintaining a large number of satellites in 
orbit to meet responsiveness requirements is 
to have a responsive launch capability and 
spacecraft available for launch. 
Space systems have been supporting the 
military warfighting commanders for many 
years. Only recently have these warfighting 
commanders been made aware of the 
4. Bob Davis, "Fleet of Big Defense Satellites May 
Be Future Pearl Harbor Awaiting a Dec 7," Wall 
Street Journal. 9 Feb. 1989, pp. 14 
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capability which could be provided to them. 
In the past, the battlefield commander has 
taken what information has been provided to 
him and made the most of it. Today those 
same battlefield commanders are asking for 
organic space resources. Additionally they 
want those space resources to be responsive 
to their needs. Small satellite systems have 
the potential to fulfill the growing 
requirement for responsive, organic space 
assets [organic in the sense that the space 
system appears to be dedicated to the 
commander while the satellite is over his 
Area of Responsibility (AOR)]. 
Current technology makes it possible to 
package a single function into a relatively 
small mass. New technology developments 
in charged coupled devices (CCD) , mosaic 
sensor arrays for different spectrums, com-
pact high speed computers for on board sen-
sor processing, more efficient power genera-
tion capabilities, and image compression 
techniq ues to decrease the data rates on ex-
isting communications links will allow small 
single purpose satellites to be produced with 
off the shelf technology/equipment. Mobile 
ground terminals consisting of powerful, 
compact computer systems capable of pro-
viding satellite commanding and mission 
data processing can be developed using ex-
isting technology to support the small satel-
lites of the future. These systems could be 
deployed to theater level commanders. 
Launching space assets has been an 
expensive proposition in the past, new in-
novative methods of achieving orbit will 
change this. The requirements of the 
battlefield commander has not been a 
driving factor in our launch strategy. This is 
changing, the USSPACECOM is conducting 
an Assured Mission Space Support 
Architecture Study (AMSSAS). This study 
will define the requirements of the 
battlefield commanders. It is expected that 
these requirements will lead to a responsive 
launch strategy and resulting launch assets. 
Achieving this launch strategy will make 
launch on demand a reality. 
The operational community has begun to 
develop operational requirements and 
concepts for the employment of tactically 
3 
responsive space assets. A fundamental 
question which must be answered is how 
long does the battlefield commander require 
or expect an organic space asset to survive 
or last in a conflict situation. The most 
popular answer would probably be, "as long 
as it is up there". There are tradeoffs which 
must be made regarding life expectancy, 
power requirements, sensing resolution, data 
rates, coverage, refresh period, etc. These 
tradeoffs will ultimately effect things such as 
satellite size, weight, and orbital parameters 
(altitude, inclination, eccentricity), and 
launch requirements. 
The combination of requirements 
defmition, technology advancements, and 
innovative launch capabilities can make 
small satellite systems affordable from a 
systems perspective. 
The roll of small satellite systems and 
multi-mission spacecraft must be well 
defmed and orchestrated to prevent 
polarizing the large satellite community 
against small satellites. Furthermore, a 
coordinated architecture must be developed 
and agreed upon to gain funding support for 
small satellite systems. 
Do these arguments support pursuing the 
development of single purpose satellites, and 
are these systems affordable under todays 
acquisition methods? 
DOD SPACE POLICY 
The United States Space Command 
(USSPACECOM) was established in 1985. 
Shortly after its creation, the other Unified 
and Specified Commanders and their staffs 
were briefed on the mission of the new 
command. Space Control was likened to 
Sea Control in the first USSPACECOM 
mission briefing presented worldwide in 
19855• This same comparison was made by 
Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci in 
his discussion of the the 1987 000 space 
policy in the NovemberlDecember issue of 
5. Warren Watkins, Roles and Missions of the Unit-
ed States Space Command, USSPACECOM 
Briefmg, (Spring 1985, Colorado Springs, Co. 
Defense 88. Secretary Carlucci further 
stated in his Defense 88 article that to 
effectively control space we 
must.. ..... "Develop, operate and maintain an 
assured mission capability through an 
appropriate mix of robust satellite control, 
assured access to space, survivability, on-
orbit sparing, proliferation, reconstitution or 
other means." The terms assured access to 
space, proliferation, and reconstitution are 
areas where small satellite systems can make 
major contributions. The national space 
policy released in 1988 concurs with the 
DoD space policy of 1987 and differentiates 
between civil and national security areas and 
commercial areas. 
Just as sea control is vital to a nation's 
ability to pursue its economic objectives 
during peace and its military objectives 
during conflict; space control also assures a 
nation the ability to pursue its economic 
objectives in space during peace and its 
military objectives during conflict. The 
commercialization of space will take on new 
meaning in the next two decades as man 
begins to live and manufacture goods in 
space. The use of satellites for 
communications, meteorology, and warning 
has already become vital to our national 
survivaL In the very near future space based 
navigation will become the sole means of 
navigation for not only the United States but 
for many of our allies as the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) becomes 
operationaL Space based systems for 
detailed earth sensing and astronomy will 
become routine. As dependence on satellites 
increases, the need for assured access to 
space becomes critical. June 14, 1989 was a 
historic day, it marked the ftrst launch of a 
Titan 4 launch vehicle, an event which was 
suppose to compensate for the loss of the 
Challenger three years earlier. A close 
examination of this launch reveals that space 
launch is not a common occurrence as some 
would have us believe. The Titan 4 was 
moved to the launch pad on May 15, 1988, a 
year prior to the actual launch. The cost of 
the Titan 4 launch vehicle was estimated at 
$220 million,. the upper stage was $45 
million, and the satellite launched was 
estimated at $187 million, bringing the total 
4 
cost to almost 1/2 billion dollars6• Clearly 
this was not a tactically responsive launch, 
but that is what the war ftghting 
commanders are asking for today. They 
want systems which they can count upon, 
they do not want their requirements placed 
in a queue and fulftlled provided they are not 
out-prioritized. They want systems which 
are "chopped" to them in a crisis. They also 
want to train with the systems during 
exercises so they can be assured their men 
can operate the system. 
SPACE SUPPORT TO WARFIGHTING 
COMMANDERS 
The warfighting commanders have been 
using space assets for a number of years, 
systems such as the Defense Satellite 
Communications System (DSCS), 
FLEETS A T, and AFSATCOM have been 
providing communications to wamghters for 
years. The Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program (DMSP) has been providing 
strategic and tactical weather data for over 
15 years. Transit has provided navigation 
data for the majority of the maritime fleet as 
well as Naval vessels for over 20 years. 
There are other systems which provide 
information, although not directly, to fteld 
forces. The operational forces are becoming 
aware of their increasing dependence on 
space systems and want to participate in the 
design of upgrades and new systems. The 
USSPACECOM has begun an Assured 
Mission Space Support Architecture Study 
(AMSSAS) and have been meeting with 
representatives from the unifIed and 
specifted commands to determine their 
requirements. It is expected that the 
AMSSAS will also dictate launch 
responsiveness requirements based on 
operational needs. 
One of the common requirements I 
remember hearing when I visited the unifted 
and specifted commands as a representative 
of the newly formed USSPACECOM was 
that the fteld commanders wanted organic 
6. "Costly new Titan 4 Rocket Carries instant-alert 
satellite into space,"Gazette Telegraph, 15 June. 
1989, p. AS, colsl-3. 
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space assets. They did not want to put their 
requirements into a queue only to be out 
prioritized by another user. I attempted to 
point out why this was not realistic since 
satellites provide global support and it did 
not make any sense to give the Commander-
in-Chief Europe (CINCEUR) total control 
over assets which could support CINC 
Pacific (CINCPAC) 45 minutes after the 
satellite left CINCEUR's AOR. The bottom 
line is that the CINC's want space assets 
"chopped" (assigned) to them during conflict 
in the same manner fighter wings, fleets, 
and armor battalions are"chopped." 
Another common comment I heard 
when touring the unified and specified 
commands was "if I don't use it every day, I 
won't use it in combat," meaning the 
battlefield commanders want their personnel 
to operate space assets day-to-day. 
Familiarity with the systems upon which 
they rely will preclude harried reference to 
complicated technical orders during a crisis 
to understand how to use those systems. 
These operational personnel also want to use 
"their" space systems during exercises. 
This does not infer that tactical commanders 
should be given launch vehicles and a supply 
of satellites to be launched as they deem 
necessary. This topic will be further 
developed in the section on operational 
concepts. 
These operational requirements can be 
fulfilled through the use of single-purpose 
inexpensive satellites which are responsive 
to tactical commanders. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY 
George C. Larson states in an editorial 
in the June/July 1989 Air & Space, "The 
achievement of that goal ( referring to the 
Apollo lunar program) did not create vast 
new technologies. To an overwhelming de-
gree, as the stories by Kenneth F. Weaver 
and T.A. Heppenheimer point out, the 
Apollo program took what was on the shelf, 
then developed and refined it. There was no 
other way to build vehicles that would be so 
reliable as to approach perfection. Whole-
sale inventions are almost never reliable. " 
5 
If this "off the shelf' approach is used to 
develop small satellite systems, a great deal 
can be saved in research and development 
time and costs; additionally, more reliable 
systems can be produced which will lead to 
greater acceptance by the operational 
community. 
Technology continues to evolve at an 
ever increasing rate. Charged-Coupled 
Devices (CCDs) will enable the creation of 
sensing arrays in multi-spectral bands, Very 
High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC), and 
Very Large Scale Integrated Circuit 
(VLSIC) will provide the capability to place 
a greater number of components on the chips 
of tomorrow. This will result in greater 
capabilities at reduced weight and power. 
As sensing capability increases, so does the 
space to ground data throughput. With 
todays technology, the transmission of large 
quantities of data to the ground requires 
broad bandwidths and high power to close 
the link with the ground stations these two 
factors are not compatible with small satel-
lite systems. Image compression techniques 
have been developed which reduce the 
quantity of data required to be transmitted to 
the ground. As satellite on-board 
capabilities increase, data can be processed 
on the satellite before transmission to the 
ground. This will further reduce the down-
link bandwidth required and permit users to 
receive only that data which concerns them. 
Small space-rated GPS receivers will 
enable a satellite to determine its ephemeris 
throughout its orbit. This infonnation will 
be transmitted to users so they can calculate 
their next contact with the satellite. This 
will eliminate the requirement to forward 
satellite ephemeris to forward users. The 
ephemeris generated will be more accurate 
than what is created today through the 
USSPACECOM satellite tracking network 
since data will be gathered throughout the 
entire orbit instead of from fixed tracking 
stations located in the northern hemisphere. 
DARPA has solicited proposals for 
Lightsat technology through a Broad Agency 
Announcement (BAA); The Office of Naval 
Research has put out a BAA for SPINSAT 
technology; AFSP ACE COM is developing a 
Statement of need for a tactical satellite 
system (TACSAT); the Air Force Systems 
Command Space System Division\ (SSD) is 
in the process of issuing a Program Research 
and Development Announcement (PRDA) 
for new, innovative, and affordable concepts 
and approaches to satisfy the tactical 
commander's dedicated intra-theater 
communications needs; SSD has issued a 
BAA for an Advanced Space Technology 
Program (ASTP), small satellite platfonns 
capable of carrying a series of specific 
experiments into space. 
Recently the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Office (SDIO) announced breakthroughs in 
the miniaturization of parts for high-
technology weapons known as "Brilliant 
Pebbles". A research and development 
vehicle was flown for a short duration by 
scientists at the Lawrence Livennore 
National Laboratory. These "Brilliant 
Pebbles" are approximately three feet long, 
one foot in diameter, and weigh "" 100 
pounds. Smaller vehicles, weighting as little 
as 1 0 pounds, are envisioned for the future 
as the size of a Cray computer is reduced to 
the size of a deck of cards. The system of 
the future will employ fiber optics. charged-
coupled devices in curved focal planes to 
provide the high resolution required to detect 
reentry vehicles over a wide field of view, 
and on-board super-computers to process the 
data. Operational concepts call for 
deployment of thousands of these small 
satellites. "Brilliant Pebbles" could be 
deployed within five years. according to the 
SDIO office7• The technology being 
developed for SDI will have spinoffs The 
advanced sensor systems, computer systems, 
and new advances in the construction of 
small satellite vehicles will make other small 
satellite systems a reality. 
The large quantities envisioned for SDI 
could drive the costs down to where small 
satellites are not only very capable but cost 
competitive with other means of gathering 
and/or distributing infonnation. 
7. William J. Broad, " 'Star Wars' weapons pared 
down in size and price," Gazette Telegraph, 30 
Apr. 1989, p. All. colsl-6. 
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All of the programs identified in the 
preceding paragraph will contribute to the 
development of small tactical satellite 
systems. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAUNCH 
Since the Challenger accident there has 
been renewed interest in expendable launch 
vehicles. The national space policy has 
encouraged commercialization of launch 
systems. One of the innovative concepts 
which DARPA is pursuing is Pegasus, an air 
launch vehicle with significant capabilities 
especially, in the small satellites arena. 
Pegasus has the potential to fulfill 
responsive rapid launch requirements for 
satellites in the 400 pound range. At 
approximately $6 million dollars per launch. 
this concept is significantly cheaper than any 
existing launch system, (approximate costs 
of existing systems are: Scout: $10 million; 
Delta: $45 million; and Titan ITI: $100 
million) 8. NASA is involved in a Standard 
Small Launch Vehicle (SSLV) program 
which has the potential to lower the cost of 
placing satellites in orbit. 
A major change is required in the 
method that launch vehicles are prepared 
and satellites integrated to the launch 
vehicle. The United States assembles the 
vast majority of its launch vehicle on the 
launch pad, perfonns checks and tests, than 
places the satellite on the launch vehicle and 
perfonns integration tests and satellite 
readiness checks. The exception to this ver-
tical assembly is the Scout launch vehicle 
which is assembled and integrated with the 
payload horizontally than erected on the 
launch pad and launched. Prior to launch a 
system readiness test is perfonned on the 
entire system. If a problem is discovered it 
is fixed on the launch pad, or if the problem 
is significant the satellite is de-mated and the 
launch vehicle is taken apart until the 
problem is identified and fixed. The launch 
vehicle "stack" is then reassembled and test-
ed again. This launch process is usually 
8. Joseph A. Harriss. "Get'em Up Seoul!" AIR & 
SPACE Smithsonian. February/ March 1989, p. 
84. 
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measured in months. If a launch failure 
occurs, further launches are halted until the 
cause is identified, a fix is made, and 
responsible personnel are fired. Contrast 
this with the launch methods of the Soviet 
Union, who integrate their launch vehicles 
horizontally in facilities adjacent to the 
launch pad, and integrate the satellite while 
the launch vehicle is still horizontal. Once 
their checks are complete they move the 
launch vehicle, with the satellite attached, to 
the launch pad and erect the "stack" and 
launch within hours or days. They have 
demonstrated a robust launch capability by 
launching several satellites from the same 
pad in a single day. The Soviets do not 
operate on 100 percent expected success. 
They have experienced a launch failure and 
launched another of the same kind of satel-
lite within days. 
The Scout launch vehicle is assembled 
and the satellite mated in the horizontal 
poSItIOn. The concept of horizontal 
integration and mating of the satellite is not 
new to our space business. This method has 
been successfully used for Scout launch 
vehicles for over fifteen years. Likewise, the 
Pegasus launch vehicle will use horizontal 
assembly and satellite integration. 
OPERATIONAL REQUffiEMENTS & 
CONCEPTS 
The Army Space Institute at Ft 
Leavenworth, KS is actively integrating 
space into the battlefield. They are 
developing Army space doctrine and a 
manual titled "Space SuPPort for Army 
Operations If. This manual defines the use of 
space-based sensors in support of 
the"AirLand Battle" doctrine9. 
Rear Adm. David Frost, Commander of 
the Naval Space Command stated to 
Aviation Week that the Navy views space 
simply as an extension of what the Navy has 
been doing for years, but from a higher 
vantage point. He further stated, "we (the 
9. If Anny doctrine calls for strike support" , 
MIliTARY SPACE, Pasha Publications Inc., 19 
June, 1989, P. 1 
7 
Navy) have a cultural bias in that we tend to 
trust the things we own and control 
ourselves. If we don't feel we've got enough 
control over [space assets], or worry that 
they won't be there when we need them, we 
won't place much dependence on them as we 
otherwise would. "10 
The Air Force conducted a Blue Ribbon 
panel last fall which developed an 
implementation plan to normalize space in 
the Air Force. The plan covers doctrine, 
strategy. force structure, organization, and 
training. The panel recommended that the 
Air Force remain the principal, but not the 
exclusive, military space agency. 11 
An operational concept which is sup-
ported by the Army and Navy would place 
the space asset under the command of the 
tactical commander so he could task the 
asset directly. The Tracking, Telemetry, and 
Commanding (IT &C) as well as anomaly 
analysis and resolution would be the 
responsibility of the Air Force Space 
Command. A nominal constellation of 
satellites would be maintained in orbit to 
allow field commanders to use the space 
asset for training and during exercises. If a 
conflict arose the tactical commander could 
request additional space assets be launched 
to fulfill his requirement. This might 
involve optimizing the constellation to meet 
the field commander's specific requirements. 
The National Academy of Sciences 
recently concluded in a study known as the 
"Navy 21 If study, that space-based systems 
will be a key factor in 21st century sea 
engagements. "Future U.S. ships may carry 
ASATs and lights at boosters. During a 
conflict, the lightsat boosters would be 
launched to augment or replace systems 
destroyed by enemy ASATs. We need to 
militarize our space assets, and that includes 
spares, If a panel member stated. The Navy 
21 study addresses the need for tactically 
responsive single purpose satellites to meet 
10. Edward H. Kolcum, .. Military Services Assess 
Optimum Use of Space in Era of Zero Budget 
Growth," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 8 
May 1989, p.87. 
11. Ibid 
the future requirements of ~e Navy.12 
AFFORDABILITY 
Small satellite systems will not become 
a reality unless the total system costs can be 
reduced to a level where the tactical forces 
can use the systems on a day to day basis for 
training, and commanders can request 
launches in support of exercises to develop 
familiarity with the systems in accordance 
with new tactics and doctrine. There are 
several methods of reducing costs, however 
changes in development, acquisition, and 
launch philosophy are required. 
In a May 2, 1989 letter from Mr. Bob 
Davis, president ofE'PRIME AEROSPACE 
CORPORATION, to the Honorable Bill 
Nelson, Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Space Science and 
Application regarding NASA's Request for 
Proposal (RFP) for the Medium Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (MEL V), Mr. Davis states 
that it will cost approximately $1.25 million 
for the combined effort of E 'PRIME and all 
their subcontractors to fully respond to the 
MEL V RFP as it is currently written. Mr. 
Davis further states that if E'PRIME treated 
the RFP like any other commercial 
procurement for a fixed price contract, it 
would cost less than $100,000 to give the 
technical and price proposals and an 
implementation plan including schedule and 
launch assurance plans 13. 
NASA's approach to doing "business as 
usual" was criticized by Representative Bill 
Nelson in a May 3, 1989 letter to Mr. Dale 
D. Meyers, Acting NASA Administrator. In 
the letter Representative Nelson encourages 
NASA to unburden industry where possible 
by departing from some of its traditional 
procurement methods in areas where the 
Federal Acquisition· Regulations authorize. 
Examples cited were cost controls and 
accounting procedures which are not 
12. "Navy mulls place in space", MILITARY SPACE, 
Pasha Publications, 19 June, 1989, p.3. 
13. Bob Davis, "NASA's Medium Expendable 
Launch Vehicle Request for Proposal ," Letter to 
the Honorable Bill Nelson, May 2,1989. 
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compatible with a fixed price contract. The 
letter concludes with the following 
statement: "I will not approve the agency's 
(NASA) plans to proceed with the small 
launch vehicle procurement without a clear 
demonstration of effort to develop a 
commercially reasonable approach. That 
procurement should reflect radical changes 
from the MELV RFP"14. 
The National Space Policy of 1988 
directs emphasis be placed on the 
commercialization of space. The 
development of space-based sensing systems 
are identified in a National Security 
Decision Directive. This commercialization 
will enhance the United States' ability to 
maintain its place among world space 
powers. It will also enhance competition for 
launch services and spacecraft development 
which will result in reduced costs. Reduced 
launch and satellite development costs are 
required to make small satellite systems a 
reality within the next decade. 
A recent decision by the Navy to test 
commercial computer technology in critical 
military programs has led Unisys Corp. to 
consider selling its $2 billion defense 
business. According to the May 29, 1989 
issue of Defense News, other diversified 
companies are getting rid of their defense 
operations, because of decreasing defense 
budgets and the bureaucracy which must be 
accommodated when doing business with 
the government1S. As stated earlier the cost 
of meeting military standards can add up to 
ten times the cost of doing business. 
Accepting commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
materials and best commercial practices for 
testing can greatly reduce the cost of space 
systems. 
It is important to understand where MIL 
standards originated and why they exist. 
The early days of the U. S. space program 
14. Bill Nelson, Rep CA, (Chairman, Subcommittee 
on Space Science and Application) Letter to 
Mr.Dale D. Meyers, Acting NASA 
Administrator, May 3, 1989. 
15. S. Denny, "Unisys Reportedly Seeks to Discard 
Defense Business," Defense News, 4, No. 22, 
29 May 1989, p.27. 
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were marked with numerous failures, launch 
failures, failure to achieve desired orbit, 
satellite infant mortality, power system 
failures, attitude control failures, satellite 
computer failures, and numerous others. In 
an attempt to eliminate these failures 
stringent standards were developed which 
were intended minimize the occurrence of 
previous failures. When new failures 
occurred new standards were developed to 
preclude a reoccurrence. I have not known 
of a single standard which has been deleted. 
It is not unusual for proposals for space 
systems to be several volumes and weigh 
several hundred pounds. The technical 
volume for the space system may be page 
limited, but the required documentation for 
cost and other areas easily fill hundreds of 
pages. In a recent article about the Wallops 
Island Space Flight Facility, Larry J. Early 
the chief of the projects division stated that 
documentation for launch is virtually zero at 
Wallops Island. This increases the level of 
risk, however NASA is willing to accept the 
risk because the launches are unmanned and 
to minimize the chance of failure through 
extensive testing and evaluation would be 
very expensive. The approach is to fly more 
missions instead of flying fail-safe16• This 
same approach could be used to decrease the 
cost of small satellite systems. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SMALL 
SATELLITES and MULTI-MISSION 
SYSTEMS 
There are large multi-mission satellite 
systems which exist today that could provide 
the tactical commander the data he requires 
to effectively and efficiently deploy his forc-
es to counter an adversary. These systems 
are not dedicated to the tactical commander, 
and while he may request suppon from 
them, his request is placed in a queue along 
with other requirements. The tactical 
commander usually does not have a high 
enough priority to successfully compete with 
other organizations and agencies, thus his re-
quirement go unfulfilled. There is nothing 
wrong with this system. Multi-mission sys-
16. Bed Brechner, "Space IsJand," AIR & SPACE 
Smithsonian, April/May 1989, p. 65. 
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tems have been developed to meet a broad 
range of requirements from differing 
organizations. The high cost of launching 
space systems has contributed to the 
philosophy of getting the most for launch 
dollars, this has translated to placing more 
sensors on satellite platforms, increasing the 
utility of the systems by performing multiple 
missions which satisfy the requirements of 
many different users. This "fly one, satisfy 
all fI approach is satisfactory provided the 
users are not dependent upon time sensitive 
information. For information to be of value 
to the tactical commander, it must be 
received in time to effect the deployment 
and employment of the commanders forces 
in a dynamic battle environment. In many 
cases this would be in near real time. If the 
tactical commanders cannot depend on the 
availability of data from multi-mission 
satellite systems, they will not use these 
systems during conflict to achieve the force 
multiplier effects possible, nor will they 
employ the doctrine and tactics developed 
around space based suppon systems. 
Tactically responsive satellite systems which 
appear to the tactical commander as organic 
resources are possible using small single 
purpose satellites, and new responsive 
inexpensive launch systems. 
These small tactical satellite systems 
would fulf111 the requirement of the tactical 
commander for a responsive, organic, 
reliable space asset. They would not be in 
competition with multi-mission systems. 
The tactical single purpose small satellite 
system could fulfill multi-mission satellite 
shortfalls resulting from on-orbit failures. 
Therefore, the two systems should be viewed 
as complementary systems, not competitive, 
each fulfilling specific requirements and 
providing a symbiotic relationship. 
SINGLE-PURPOSE SATELLITES 
The vast majority of satellites in orbit 
today are multi-purpose. As a result these 
satellites tend to be large and expensive and 
require large expensive launch vehicles 
which take several months to prepare for 
launch. The concept of a single purpose 
satellite assumes that technology exists 
which would enable the IDlsslon to be 
perfonned by a small satellite. If the satellite 
is small the launch vehicle could be small. 
Thus the cost of the overall system would be 
lower than current systems. Potential 
missions which could be accomplished by 
small satellite systems would be: 
communications; surveillance (imaging and 
electronic); meteorological; and store and 
forward missions involving remote sensors. 
As new technology evolves so will 
additional missions. 
COST REDUCTION 
A philosophical change is required in 
the method we acquire our space systems. 
The frrst thing which must be accomplished 
is to analyze the requirements for the 
system: How long must it operate? How 
many are required (block buys can save 
substantial amounts on the system buy)? 
What response requirements have been 
identified? Is a launch system available, or 
will one have to be designed and procured? 
How do we build small satellites cheap-
ly? Highly complex electronic equipment is 
being developed and produced today. This 
equipment is highly reliable, due in many 
cases to redundancy of high failure items. In 
the computer industry this pro~ss; in 
technology is evident. At the begiririifl,tof 
1989 Apple offered memory upgrades for 
Macintosh SE computers at a cost of $1200 
per megabyte. In May. 1989, one megabyte 
upgrades could be purchased for $181.00. In 
June 1989, the cost of one megabyte 
upgrades dropped to $131. By the end of 
1989 the cost is expected to drop to $100.00 
or less. These computer memory chips 
come with a lifetime warrantee. This simple 
example of the rate of evolution in 
technology enhancements available today 
only touches the surface. New materials 
with exciting properties are being developed 
every day and have the potential to perfonn 
far beyond one's imagination. 
Even though technology breakthroughs 
will continue to occur and provide greater 
capabilities. getting this technology into 
today's defense or space systems is not an 
10 
easy task. Much of the technology is 
developed for application outside the space 
arena. Therefore, it is not space rated nor 
does it meet MIL STDS or Mll... SPECS. 
Hardware which falls in this category is 
referred to as Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS). If COTS hardware were used to 
build the tactical satellites described earlier 
in this paper the cost could be reduced by at 
least 10 times. This reduction in cost would 
result from: 1) not having to maintain a 
library of all applicable Mll... STDS; 2) not 
having to test all materials and parts in 
accordance with the appropriate MIL STD; 
3) procuring material commercially; and 4) 
developing alternatives to space rating re-
quirements. 
Are volumes of Mll... STDS required to 
build small single purpose satellites? If the 
answer is yes, they will probably not be 
inexpensive. To answer this. one must look 
at how and why Mll... STDS were created. 
The early days of the space program were 
punctuated by numerous failures. These 
ranged from launch failures to hard satellite 
failures. When failures occurred, investiga-
tions were conducted to determine their 
causes. In order to preclude a reoccurrence 
of these failures, standards were developed 
which tended to be applied to all space 
programs. These standards continued to 
grow in number and add to the large volume 
of paperwork involved in producing a space 
system. In an article on the Scout launch 
vehicle Paul Goozh describes the problems 
encountered in the early days of the Scout. 
He states that after all the lessons were 
learned, standard operating procedures 
filled "seven fat volumes. It He further states 
that after 25 years the procedures are 
virtually the same. 
Despite the "seven fat volumes" of 
standard operating procedures, the Scout is 
an excellent example of the application of 
off-the-shelf technology and hardware being 
combined to produce a system; the first 
stage was taken from the the Navy's Polaris 
missile; the second stage Castor was a 
derivative of the of the Anny's Sergeant; 
the third and fourth stages were versions of 
the Navy's Vanguard. By using existing 
technology and hardware, both time and 
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money were saved in developing the Scout. 17 
Likewise. in the future. using 
streamlined launch and integration proce-
dures, and employing COTS technology, 
space assets which are timely, more 
responsive to operational exigencies, and 
cost-effective are within reach. 
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